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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0064

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E.O. 11652 XGDSI
TAGS: PARM
SUBJ: STATEMENTS BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV AND GENERAL TRUSOV
ON MARCH 4, 1975 (SALT TWO-544)

THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV AND
GENERAL TRUSOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF MARCH 4, 1975.

SEmenov Statement, March 4, 1975

ARTICLE I OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD
UNTIL THE END OF 1985, WHICH IS UNDER CONSIDERATION,
PROVIDES THAT THE SIDES WILL UNDERTAKE TO LIMIT STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY, AND ALSO
TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THESE PROVISIONS, WHICH
EXPRESS THE COMMON APPROACH OF THE SIDES TO THE PROBLEM
OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE TERM OF THE
NEW AGREEMENT, ARE GIVEN CONCRETE EXPRESSION IN HTE
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SUBSEQUENT INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES OF THE DRAFT.

AT THE FEBRUARY 18, 1975 MEETING, THE USSR DELEGATION SET FORTH ITS CONSIDERATIONS ON ARTICLE IX OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, WHICH PROVIDES THAT EACH SIDE WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, LISTED IN THAT ARTICLE.

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION WILL ADDRESS ARTICLE VIII OF THE DRAFT, WHICH CONTAINS OTHER SPECIFIC PROVISIONS REGARDING LIMITATIONS AND THE EXERCISE OF RETRAINT BY THE SIDES IN DEVELOPING NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974 RECORDS THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT COULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC ARMS DURING ITS TERM. ARTICLE VIII OF THE DRAFT SATISFIES THIS ELEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES.

IN PARTICULAR, THE ARTICLE PROVIDES FOR AN UNDER-TAKING BY THE SIDES NOT TO EQUIP ANY TYPE OF AIRPLANE, HELICOPTER OR AIRCRAFT, OTHER THAN THE BOMBERS MENTIONED IN ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 2(C), OF THE EXISTING DRAFT, WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES HAVING A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS.

IT IS ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE SIDES THAT AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES HAVING A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS CAN BE EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. THE QUESTION OF MEASURES TO LIMIT THESE VEHICLES WAS CONSIDERED DURING THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT MEETING, AND THE SIDES REACHED THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES HAVING A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, EACH SUCH MISSILE WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT WITHIN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. THE UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SCORE IS ACCURATELY RENDERED IN ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 2(C), OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT UNDER CONSIDERATION.

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THIS PROVISION IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE WITHIN THE OVERALL COMPLEX OF MEASURES OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985. THE PROVISION, CONTAINED IN ARTICLE VIII OF THE DRAFT, FOR THE SIDES TO REFRAIN FROM EQUIPPING AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, ENSUES FROM THE ESSENCE OF THAT PROVISION, SINCE IT IS A NATURAL AND NECESSARY COMPLE-

MENT THERETO. I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE IN THIS CONNECTION THAT ARTICLE VIII OF THE DRAFT, JUST LIKE ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 2(C), DEALS WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES OF ALL TYPES HAVING A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, I.E., REGARDLESS OF TYPE OF TRAJECTORY OR OTHER CHARACTERISTICS.

THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE VIII UNDER DISCUSSION ALSO CONTAINS A BROADER MEANING. IT COULD HARDLY BE DISPUTED THAT DEPLOYMENT OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, HAVING A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, ON AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS, OBJECTIVELY WOULD CONSTITUTE A NEW DIRECTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND COULD LEAD TO EXPANDING THE ASSORTMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS, HOWEVER, WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES PURSUED BY THE NEW AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS WITH THE COURSE THE SIDES HAVE TAKEN TOWARD THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS A WHOLE. BY ASSUMING THE OBLIGATIONS NOT TO EQUIP AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS WITH SUCH MISSILES, THE SIDES WOULD BLOCK THE POSSIBILITY OF A BUILDUP IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS; THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS TO BE ADOPTED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. AND CONVERSELY, IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS LIMITATION, THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A BUILDUP WOULD REMAIN, THIS COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE THE LIMITATIONS ON HEAVY BOMBERS AND AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, WHICH ARE PROVIDED FOR BY THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING AND, AS HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED, ARE AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT PART OF THE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE VIII ALSO PROVIDES FOR THE OBLIGATION NOT TO USE
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TRANSPORT AIRPLANES AS NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, AND NOT TO CONVERT THEM FOR SUCH PURPOSES.

SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD ALSO HAVE A SERIOUS IMPACT IN TERMS OF ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, PROVIDED FOR IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. AS YOU KNOW, THE FLEET OF TRANSPORT AIRPLANES IS RATHER SIGNIFICANT IN A QUANTITATIVE RESPECT. IF THE POSSIBILITY OF USING TRANSPORT AIRPLANES AS NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES WERE TO REMAIN UNBLOCKED, THERE COULD BE A DANGER THAT THE AGREED LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE WEAKENED AND EVEN UNDERMINED. FOR, REALLY, IN THAT EVENT WE WOULD BE FACING THE APPEARANCE OF STILL ANOTHER NEW CATEGORY OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. SUCH A TURN OF EVENTS WOULD NOT BE IN

ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE. IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS, TH U.S. SIDE HAS EXPRESSED CONSIDERATIONS LEADING IN THE DIRECTION OF BANNING THE USE OF TRANSPORT AIRPLANES AS NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, AND THEIR CONVERSION FOR SUCH PURPOSES.

THUS, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE DRAFT, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, ARE CALLED UPON TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ENHANCING THE VIABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT, BLOCKING THE POSSIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTING ITS PROVISIONS THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS ON ANY AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS, AS WELL AS THROUGH THE USE OF TRANSPORT AIRPLANES AS NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. ASSUMPTION BY THE SIDES OF CLEAR OBLIGATIONS ON THIS SCORE WOULE BE A CONCRETE MANIFESTATION OF RESTRAINT WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS; THIS WOULD ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0064

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TRUSOV STATEMENT, MARCH 4, 1975

TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO THE ISSUE OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES AND HEAVY BOMBERS.

TO BEGIN WITH, I WILL TAKE THE LIBERTY OF REMINDING YOU OF THE AID-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, WHICH STATES THAT WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES HAVING A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, EACH SUCH MISSILE WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT WITHIN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS (2,400 UNITS).

THIS WORDING DOES NOT LEAVE ANY DOUBT THAT THE AFORE-MENTIONED AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, BECAUSE THEY ARE STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, MUST INCLUDE ANY SUCH MISSILES REGARDLESS OF TYPE OF TRAJECTORY.

THE U.S. DELEGATION NOTED IN ITS STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 21 THAT THE U.S. SIDE UNDERSTANDS THIS PART OF
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THE AIDE-MEMOIRE TO APPLY ONLY TO AIR-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES.

IN THIS CONNECTION THE FOLLOWING QUESTION ARISES: WHAT GROUNDS CAN THERE BE FOR SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPLETELY CLEAR AND UNAMBIGIOUS WORDING IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE?

AS YOU KNOW, FLIGHT TRAJECTORIES OF THE AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES UNDER CONSIDERATION CAN BE QUITE DIVERSE. THERE IS NOT ONLY A BALLISTIC MISSILE TRAJECTORY OR THAT OF A CRUISE MISSILE, BUT THERE IS ALSO THE WHOLE DIVERSITY OF THEIR POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS. IT IS QUOTE OBVIOUS THAT THE TRAJECTORY PARAMETER CAN IN NO WAY BE REGARDED AS A CRITERION OF WHETHER A GIVEN TYPE OF MISSILE SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE CLASSIFIED AS A STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLE. ALL TYPES OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, NOT JUST BALLISTIC MISSILES, MUST BE CLASSIFIED AS STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES.

IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING. DURING DISCUSSION OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, ATTEMPTS WERE MADE AT TIMES TO LINK THE SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION TO AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS. AIR DEFENSE MATTERS ARE NOT THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THE TASK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND THEREFORE THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR TRYING TO LINK STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES OF ONE TYPE OR ANOTHER WITH THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS OF THE SIDES.

IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE APPROACH TO RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, WHICH THE U.S. DELEGATION IS SETTING FORTH, IMPLIES A CLEAR EFFORT TO LEAVE OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF LIMITATIONS ONE OF THE TYPES OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES; THIS IS COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO THE TASKS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

THE WORDING OF ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING THAT THE AIR-TO SURFACE MISSILES OF ALL TYPES HAVING A RANGE
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OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS MUST BE COUNTED WITHIN THE OVERALL MAXIMUM LEVEL OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES.

A FEW WORDS ABOUT HEAVY BOMBERS. THE QUESTION IS

NOW NEW; IT WAS THE SUBJECT OF EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. THERE HAD BEEN AS AGREED VIEW TO THE EFFECT THAT HEAVY BOMBERS MUST INCLUDE THE EXISTING NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT OF THE SIDES, FOR THE U.S.--THE B-52, AND FOR THE USSR--THE TUPOLEV-95 AND THE MYASISHCHEV. THE SIDES ALSO DID NOT IN ANY WAY DOUBT THAT UPON THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW BOMBER IN THE U.S., THE B-1, IT, TOO, HAD TO BE INCLUDED AMONG HEAVY BOMBERS. IN

THIS CONNECTION IT IS QUITE NATURAL THAT AS FAR AS THE USSR IS CONCERNED, HEAVY BOMBERS MUST INCLUDE NEW AIRCRAFT BEING OR TO BE DEVELOPED, WHICH HAVE CHARACTERISTICS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE B-1 BOMBER. THIS IS A CRITERION WHICH IS CLEAR TO THE SIDES, AND WHICH MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHAT NEW AIRCRAFT BEING OR TO BE DEVELOPED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WITHIN THE OVERALL MAXIMUM LEVEL OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. SUCH AN APPROACH IS OBJECTIVE, AND IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.

AS FOR OTHER AIRCRAFT, THERE ARE NO GROUNDS WHATSOEVER TO INCLUDE THEM IN THE CATEGORY OF HEAVY BOMBERS. ATTEMPTS TO COMPARE INDIVIDUAL, ARBITRARILY SELECTED DATA PERTAINING TO OTHER AIRCRAFT, WITH THOSE OF THE MYASISHCHEV BOMBER, AS WAS DONE IN GENERAL ROWNY'S STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 21, 1975, CAN ONLY SERVE TO INDICATE A BIASED APPROACH TO RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION.

THE DEFINITION OF HEAVY BOMBERS, SET FORTH IN OUR STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 18, 1975, IS IN ACCORD WITH THE TRUE SITUATION IN THIS FIELD AT PRESENT, AND TAKES INTO ACCOUNT POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF

THE TERM OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

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